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Abstract 
In this paper we look at the effect of the removal of firm-specüic binding and 
non-binding quotas in experimental posted offer markets. In the experiments we see that the 
effect of both binding and non-binding quotas is carried over to the deregulated regime. The 
effect of non-binding quotas, while being in effect, on the number of contracts is 
(statistically) signüicant. We also see that distribution of surplus may actually affect the 
convergence path of prices. That is, with binding quotas price convergence is observed 
from below the competitive equilibrium. 
1. Introduction 
This paper looks at the effect of firm-specific quotas in a posted offer market. 
The effect of firm-specific quotas (binding or non-binding), and their removal, 
upon market performance has not been examined in experimental markets yet. 
The only other work involving quantity controls, specifically in experimental 
markets, has been done by Plott (1983). However, Plott did not look explicitly at 
the effect of firm-specific quotas, or their removal, upon market performance. 
Plott used quantity restrictions for the standard approach to pollution. He found 
that prices show little or no tendency to converge to the competitive equilibrium 
(CE). However, Plott did not directly control the output of the firms through 
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individual firm quotas. Qnly the output of the market as a whole was restricted. 
The~e has been other experimental work on quantity constraints (see, Kruse et al., 
Davls et al.), however, the constraints are not in the form of firm-specific quotas 
that are subsequently lifted. ' 
. Gener~l! speaking, firm-spe~ific quotas are more common than market quotas. 
Flrm-speciflC quotas are used m planned economies, where the center directs 
individual firms to meet output goals. In the USA examples of producer-specific 
q~o~as are used in the market for hops, tobacco, oranges, lemons, grapefruit, and 
ralsms. A new generation of pollution permits will also be firm-specific (although 
the pollution permits can be traded between firms) 1. We thus see that firm-specifi~ 
quotas are a prevalent mode of regulatory control. Examples of market quotas 
(Plott, 1983) are not as common. This makes the experimental analysis of 
firm-specific quantity restrictions, and their removal, interesting. 
In this paper we will look at the effect of individual firm quotas, and their 
removal, upon a posted offer institution 2. In the posted offer exchange mechanism 
sellers post prices (offers to sell) at the start of each periodo Seller prices are 
ranked in ascending order, and the buyers are then randomly selected. A buyer 
may purchase as many units as they want as long as the purchase price is less than 
(or equal to) their marginal valuation. After all the buyers have finished purchas-
ing, the next period starts with the seller posting the prices. The posted offer 
institution is examined because it is representative of several common form of 
exchange, especially in many retail markets. 
This study seeks to look at the effect of quotas upon: 
(¡) Price levels and variability. The average price level of a contract periodo 
The price variability during that period is studied The impact of the removal of 
quotas on price, and price variation, is studied. With binding quotas, economic 
theory predicts that the removal of quotas will cause the price to converge to the 
competitive equilibrium. That is, if the market price (with quotas) is aboye (at) the 
CE, then the removal of quotas will result in the price converging to the CE. 
(ii) Market efficiency. How does the imposition of quotas affect market 
efficiency? Tbat is, do firm-specific quantity controls significantly affect surplus 
realization in posted-offer markets. 
(ii¡) Output (total contracts) levels. Do quotas result in an output different than 
what is given (by the quotas)? The impact of the removal of quotas (binding or 
non-binding) on market output is also of interest. 
In .the next section we present an experimental design developed to study these 
questlOns. 
1 See Franciosi et al., 1990. 
2 For detailed instructions see Ketcham et al., 1984. 
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Fig. 1. Marginal cost and marginal valuations 
2. Experimental design 
. . . 
The experiments used the Plato posted offer exchange mechamsm. There are 
three different experimental designs, (i) the baseline (with no quantity restrictions), 
(ií) non-binding quotas (the sum of seller capacities equals the competitive 
outcome for the baseline; thus, the competitive price, and quantity, out come for 
the baseline and the non-binding quota is the same) and (iií) binding quotas (the 
sum of the seller capacities is less than the competitive outcome for the baseline). 
In the second and third categories of experiments the quotas are removed midway 
('quotas/no-quotas', or O/N experiments). 
The impact of quotas (binding or non-binding) on prices is studied using 
grouped data. Paired t-tests are used to compare average price, price deviation 
(from the CE), and contract levels in the experiments. Hopefully, more insight will 
be gained on the impact of the removal of quotas· on the institutional dynamics 
from the O/N experiments 3. 
As the focus of this paper is to look at seller (producer) behavior with quantity 
restrictions and no countervailing power (of buyers) the buyers are simulated. The 
buyers are perfect revealers and accept zero 'profit'. That is, buyers are willing to 
trade units at a price equal to their redemption values. 
(i) Baseline (BSL) experiments (Fig. 1). The baseline design is characterized by 
four sellers capable of selling five units each and four buyers capable of buying 
five units each. The surplus is distributed symmetrically among the buyers and the 
sellers. At the CE 12-13 4 units can be traded (for the resale and cost values see 
Table 1). Note, that units are expressed as deviations from the low cost unit. 
3 To control for the length of tbe paper the statistical results are not tabulated. The interested reader 
may write to the autbor for the longer version of the papero 
4 From now on we use CE as being at 12 units, as tbe thirteenth is never traded at zero profits by 
sellers. We thus use the lower bound of 12 as tbe competitive equlibria. 
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Table 1. 
Marginal cost and marginal valuation 
Unit-1 Unit-2 Unit-3 Unit-4 Unit-5 
Buyer 1 5.60 5.55 5.45 5.30 5.20 Buyer 2 5.55 5.50 5.45 5.25 5.15 Buyer 3 5.55 5.50 5.45 5.25 5.15 Buyer4 5.60 5.55 5.45 5.30 5.20 
Seller 1 5.00 5.05 5.15 5.30 5.40 
Seller 2 5.05 5.10 5.15 5.35 5.45 
Seller 3 5.00 5.05 5.15 5.35 5.55 
Seller 4 5.05 5.10 5.15 5.40 5.50 
(ii) Quotas at the CE (non-binding quotas (NBQ» (Fig. 1). In this design the 
sum ~f the sellers' capacities equals thirteen. This leaves the competitive price and 
quantlty outcome unchanged from the baseline experiments. 
(iii) Quotas below the CE (binding quotas (BQ» (Fig. 1). Rere the sum of the 
sellers' capacities equals eight. The competitive outcome is in a 5 cent range, from 
15-20 cents aboye the CE in the NBQ/BSL designo In the case of binding quotas 
the surplus distribution is skewed in favor of the sellers. 
Th~ subjects rec~ive a special announcement that during each trading period 
q~antity controls wdl be in effect when appropriate. If any seller attempts to 
vlOlate the quota restriction, that is, sell more units than their (maximum) 
produc~on quota, this results in the rejection of the sellers offer until the output 
con.straIDt (quota) is satisfied. This design is similar to that used by Coursey and 
Smlth (1983), except that firm quotas are used instead of price controls. Subjects 
are also told that their capacity is determined by a central authority. This 
announcement is made to all the subjects. They are also given individual an-
nouncements that state their capacities. The announcement at the start of the 
expe~me.nt reads: "Your capacity is determined by a central authority. Your 
capaclty IS •.•. Please make sure that the number on the screen coincides with the 
capacity stated.' , 
. One period prior to the removal of the quotas, an announcement is again made 
In regards to the change in capacity. Subjects are told individually what their 
"new" capacities are. Note, that everyone knows that the individual capacities 
have been changed, however, individual capacity changes are private information. 
The announcement reads as follows: "The central authority has now decided to 
change your capacities. You now have a capacity of FIVE units. Please make sure 
that the monitor screen shows the correct amount." 
The purpose behind the announcements is to emulate an environment where 
capacities are announced by a central authority. That is, authorities announce their 
intention to increase (or, decrease) the quota limits set upon firms. 
Each trading period starts with a seller posting the price, and the total number 
of units she is willing to sell at that price. Once all the sellers have made their final 
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offers, they are notified about the other sellers' offer prices. The buyers are then 
randomly queued to initiate the buyer procedure. If the units available from a 
particular seller have been exhausted, they are given the message 'out of stock'. 
After all the buyers have completed their purchasing the trading period ends. Each 
experiment consists of twenty trading periods. The trading periods are split into 
groups of ten each. For the Q/N experiments quantity controls are in effect for the 
first ten periods, and removed for the remaining ten periods. 
The rationale behind the quotas at the CE is that we want to see how much 
distortion 'mere' quotas can cause. That is, with quotas at the CE, do we get the 
same outcome as the theoretical competitive (price and quantity) outcome (with 
and without quotas)? We can thus test whether quotas alone, or their removal, can 
cause the market outcome to change. 
With non-binding quotas each individual firm can sell at most three units (the 
same as at the CE for the baseline). Rowever, seller 1 has an additional unit at the 
CE. (The competitive outcdme of 12 (and not 13) is realized as we do not give 
commissions for the units traded.) With the binding quotas each individual firm 
can sell at most two units. 
3. Experimental results 
We report results from five experiments each for the baseline, binding quotas, 
and non-binding quotas. 
In our experiments we get two interesting results from non-binding and binding 
quota experirnents. In the non-binding quota experiments the number of contracts 
remains well below the competitive level of 12 (the number of contracts is also 
less than in the baseline experiments). After the (non-binding) quotas are removed, 
output in the subsequent periods remains depressed and slowly starts to converge 
towards the competitive outcome (similar results are obtained for binding-quota 
experiments). This result duplicates similar resuIts obtained in price control 
experiments (see, Coursey-Smith, Isacc-Plott, and Smith-Williams). 
In the binding quota experirnents, the average price converges from below the 
CE when the quotas are in effect. This resuIt contradicts the well known artifact 
that average price in the posted offer experiments converges from aboye 5. (The 
upper support of the CE price with binding quotas is $5.50, and the lower support 
is $5.45). 
Paired t-tests are used to test for the impact of quotas upon contracts and price. 
Paired t-tests are also used to compare deviations from the CE for the BQ-NBQ, 
and BQ-BSL, pairings. That is, the number of contracts in each experirnent is 
paired (pair-wise) against the contracts in the non-binding quota and the baseline 
experiments. 
5 For a discussion on asymmetric surplus distribution and the price convergence path see Kujal, P., 
1992. 
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The paired t-tests on contracts show that non-binding quotas tend to depress the 
number of contracts significantIy. For the NBQ-BSL pair 15 (of 25) pairs are 
significantly different at the 95% confidence level (el), and 21 at the 90% el. We 
thus see that non-binding quotas have a marked impact on the number of units 
contracted. 
Paired t-tests on posted and contracted prices are also done. For contracted 
prices we see that for the NBQ-BSL 2 pairs are significantIy different at the 95% 
el, and 5 at the 90% el. For the BQ-NBQ pair 8 are significantIy different at the 
95% el, and 12 at the 90% cl. Similarly, for the BSL-BQ pair 5 are different at 
the 95% el, and 6 at the 90% cl. 
For the posted prices we see that the results are slightly different. That is, the 
BSL-BQ comparison has 5 significantIy different at the 5% el, and 6 at the 90% 
cl. For the BSL-NBQ pairing we see that 2 are significantly different at the 95% 
el, and 5 at the 90% cl. Similarly, the BQ-NBQ comparison shows that 8 are 
significantIy different at 95% and 12 at 90% cl. 
We thus present conelusive evidence in favor of the impact of quotas on the 
number of units contracted. However, the impact on prices is mixed for individual 
experiments, though conelusive for the estimates run on pooled data (cross section 
time series). Also, price adjustment is significantIy affected by quotas. 
Below, we discuss the outcomes for each experimental designo 
3.1. No quantity controls (baseline) 
In these experiments price converges from aboye the CE. The average price 
decreases as the experiment progresses, however, price convergence is slow (Figs. 
2a and 2b). In all the (five) experiments contracts converge to the CE outcome 
(12) between the seventh period and the twelfth period (Fig. 3). In the experiments 
that converge late, contracts converge within one unit of the CE around period 
eight or nine. The average efficiency levels in the five experiments converge to 
high 80th percentile by the 12th period (Fig. 4). No experiments reached effi-
ciency levels in the high nineties 6. 
Slow price convergence (to the CE) can be explained by the fact that at the CE 
the demand and supply steps (supports) are separated by 30 cents. Thus, the CE is 
not the Nash equilibria. For example, let three se11ers post prices at the competitive 
equilibrium ($5.30). This implies that each one of them can se11 three units at the 
CE. Let the se11ers be sellers 2-4, this implies that seller 1 can make an offer of 
$5.35 (se11 all his units) and make a larger profit. However, any price greater than 
$5.35 will a110w sellers 2 and 3 to se11 their extra-marginal units. Thus, CE is not 
the pure strategy Nash equilibria. If a11 sellers price in this fashion, we will get 
6 All the experiments exhibit relatively low effiCÍency levels compared to the posted offer price 
control experiments in Coursey and Smith (1983). 
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price cycles between the lower and upper bounds of the MSN. As a result we may 
not get convergence to the CE. This may explain the slow (or no) convergence to 
the CE. 
Now, looking at efficiency levels we see that the average efficiency levels are 
relatively low. Efficiency levels of 100% are never reached in any of the 
experiments (almost a11 experiments reach efficiency levels in the high eighties). 
This may also have to do with experimental design where one gets Edgeworth 
cyeles. That is, we may observe price cyeles whereby sellers may price themselves 
out of the market, resulting in subsequentIy lower prices. Price cyeles as these may 
result in contracts less than the CE (12 units), and hence lower efficiencies. 
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3.2. Non-binding quotas (NBQ) 
Five experiments are mn with non-binding quotas. In aH the experiments no 
noticeable change in the average contracted price is observed after the (non-bind-
ing) controls are removed. As far as price convergence is concemed (see Figs. 2a 
and 2b), one can see that the average price decreases across periods, however, it 
does not converge to the CE. 
It is quite evident that non-binding quotas affect the units contracted. In the five 
experiments quantity sold is substantiaHy less than the CE quantity of 12 (see Fig. 
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3). Comparing this with the baseline we see that units contracted are less than 
under the baseline and remain so even after quotas are removed (Fig. 3). 
We thus see that non-binding controls tend to depress the units contracted, and 
also affect the contracts in the subsequent periods. It is also evident that the effect 
of non-binding controls is carried over to the regime without controls. 
Now, looking at average (contracted) prices we see that the average price in the 
NBQ design (for aH five experiments) is slightly above the average price in the 
baseline experiment from period five to fourteen (see Fig. 2a). Interestingly, if we 
look at the posted prices (Fig. 2b) we see that when non-binding quotas are in 
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effect, average prices are slight1y aboye the baseline prices, and show higher 
variation (relative to the CE) compared to the (average) prices in the baseline 
experiments. Thus, posted prices seem to have a larger variation while non-bind-
ing controls are in effect 7. 
7 See Kujal, ibid. 
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From the data available so far we see that non-binding quotas cause units 
contracted to be below the CE, and contracts remain depressed even after the 
removal of non-binding controls. Both posted and contracted prices seem to be 
slight1y higher than prices in the baseline experiments. Also, posted prices exhibit 
higher variation when non-binding quotas are in effect (compared to the baseline 
experiments). 
The impact of non-binding quotas on seller surplus share is best studied by 
comparing it with the baseline. Conceming the sellers' share of the total surplus, 
we see that the realization in the first period is at 80.77%, eventually c1imbing to 
127.46% (Fig. 4). This realization is 10% lower than the baseline. Paired t-tests 
suggest that the seller realization of surplus under the baseline design is signifi-
cant1y different than the (seller) realization of surplus in the non-binding quota 
designo 
3.3. Binding quotas (BQ) 
Five experiments are run with binding controls. With binding controls all 
sellers can sell at most two units. After the controls are removed they can sell 
three units each at the CE. 
An interesting result arising from these experiments is that the average con-
tracted price converges (Fig. 2a) from below the CE (CE has a spread of five 
cents) while the binding quotas are in effect. (The upper and lower support of the 
CE is $5.50 and $5.45, respectively.) The average contract price in the first period 
of the (five) BQ experiments is lower than the average contracted price in the 
NBQ experiment for the first seven periods. The average contracted price is also 
below the first five periods of the BSL experiments. This price convergence from 
below the CE is unlike price convergence in other posted offer experiments 8. 
Comparing the average posted price we see that it starts aboye the CE for all 
the experiments. The average posted price in the BQ experiments is less than the 
posted price in the BSL experiments for the three (out) of the first four periods, 
and for the first nine periods against the NBQ experiments. We thus see that the 
average price, posted or contracted, is depressed in the initial periods of the BQ 
treatment. 
One can argue that convergence from below may be observed whenever one 
has distribution of surplus favoring the sellers. That is, in the limit, if the 
consumer surplus is zero (and the resale values of the buyers is the same as CE) 
one will observe price convergence from below the CE. A question that arises out 
of this is, "What distribution of asymmetric surplus will switch the convergence 
from aboye CE to below it". To answer this question empirically, experiments can 
be run to see when this happens. 
Also, the effect of quotas upon the post-quota regime is evident. That is, 
8 See Kujal, ibid. 
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contracts in periods 11-14 (Fig. 3) tend to remain below the CE. The impact of 
quotas (binding or non-binding) into the post-quota regime is also observed in the 
NBQ experiments. 
Comparing the total realization, we see that (note, aH BQ efficiencies are 
relative to the BSL design) binding quota design is the least efficient of aH at 
66.98%. The other two designs show average total realization at 76.97% and 
75.86%, for the BSL and NBQ design respectively. Also, t-tests confirm that the 
pairs, BSL-BQ and BQ-NBQ, are significantly different at the 1% cl. 
We thus see that non-binding quotas significantly affect the number of con-
tracts. The impact on prices using t-tests is not significant, however, regression 
run on the aggregate data indicate that non-binding quotas affect prices and price 
adjustment significantly. 
4. Conclusion 
Two interesting results arise from the experiments run aboye. First, as has been 
observed in the price control experiments, non-binding price controls tend to 
substantiaHy affect institutional performance. One sees that the institutional effects 
of non-binding quotas are carried over to periods without the quantity constraints. 
Thus, past regulatory controls affect institutional performance in the future (as has 
also been observed in the price control experiments). 
Second, with binding quotas (average) price convergence is observed from 
below the CE. This is unlike the results observed in other posted offer experiments 
done and is contrary to the claim by Davis and Williams (1986) that the 
convergence path of prices is not affected by surplus distribution. 
We also see no jump (or overshoot of the CE) in price after the quotas, binding 
or non-binding, are removed. This overshooting, prevalent in aH the price control 
experiments (both in the posted offer and the double oral auctions), does not seem 
to carry over to the quota experiments. For the aggregate model (cross section time 
series) estimates we observe that prices seem to be significantly affected by the 
non-binding quotas. This is not affirmed by the individual experiment estimates. 
As far as distribution of surplus is concemed, surprisingly, with binding quotas 
seHers have low efficiency levels (on the average). 
Looking at the impact of quotas on prices, price deviation, and contracts, in the 
aggregate, we can say that quotas, binding or non-binding, affect all these 
variables. Individual responses vary, and sorne individual seHers behavior is not 
consistent with the aggregate results. However, what is evident is that market 
controls, binding or non-binding, affect market performance. 
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